Diamond in the Techno-Thriller: The Value of Speculative Fiction

A few years ago, some sort of switch got flipped in my brain and all of a sudden I became far more capable of and willing to plow through half a dozen novels in a single stretch than to finish a single non-fiction book. Recently, equilibrium has been at least somewhat restored, but I continue to find myself immersed in fiction in a way that I rarely was before.

Some recent reading has included a pair of Larry Bond novels from the late 1980s and early 1990s, Vortex and Cauldron. Larry Bond is most famously, of course, the man who helped Tom Clancy game out many of his books’ wartime scenarios (and Bond co-wrote Red Storm Rising with Clancy). I hadn’t known Bond as an author in his own right, but recently read those two works of his in succession.

What’s wonderful about books like these is generally not their literary qualities, but nor is it even the conduct or proposed sequence of events in particular conflicts. Can fiction, in fact, predict the future of warfare? Perhaps, but more interestingly, such books serve as a time capsule of the era in which they were written. Much of the “valued added” from this is detailed (at times overly so) descriptions and explanations of the weaponry, arms systems, and military organization of the era. But furthermore, while not predictive in any meaningful way, these novels can help widen the Overton Window of the imagination, to at least consider a divergent future drastically different from our own.

With books set in the future, but now a dated future, it’s almost like reading alternate history. As of this writing, I’m reading The Third World War: August 1985, which is an account of World War III written in the past tense as a historical survey from the point of view of two years later (e.g., 1987). Of course, the book was actually published in 1979, along with a followup, The Third World War: The Untold Story, which was published two years later and dives deeper into specifics of nuclear postures, the war in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, Solidarity’s effect in Poland, and other issues. It is a look at a world that never was, but seemed frightfully close to being so. And from that perspective, it’s a chilling look at the prospective war facing the world of the past.

Obviously, these never came to pass, but when one considers what might have been, that can seem a blessing.

Vortex, published in 1991, is an account of a war in which the truly radical hardcore racists in the Afrikaner government launch a coup by allowing an African National Congress (ANC) plot to destroy the Blue Train carrying much of the senior South African leadership to proceed without interference. Immediately the South African Defence Forces launch an incursion to retake Namibia; meanwhile, Angola and its socialist allies – most notably, the Cubans – begin streaming into Namibia and South Africa to repel the SADF invaders. Also, a civil war breaks out and a heroic American journalist (a white guy, of course) finds himself in the middle of things.

Obviously, reading this book in a post-Apartheid world is a rather different experience than that envisioned by the author. In one set-piece, US forces lead a raid on the Pelindaba nuclear facility; it was a surprise to me how much was known or suspected about South Africa’s nuclear program before the era of Reconciliation. But if nothing else, Vortex lays out in good detail the military forces and equipment available to these regional combatants in the era. Even from a distance, Vortex can also help illuminate the far-off divisions and sectarian struggles of the day – reading about the role of dissatisfied Afrikaners and white Anglophone South Africans in fomenting an anti-right-wing separatism (as well as the differences between the two) points to a split that might have been unknown to the casual reader.

Ralph Peters’ The War in 2020, which I’ve not yet read more than the jacket of, offers a wonderfully ludicrous late 1980s perspective of future war (and I can guarantee that in five years’ time its predictions will not come to pass). The original blurb from Publishers Weekly says it all: “America’s Seventh Cavalry, armed with a surprise electronic weapon, rushes to the aid of the Soviet Union, overrun by a Japanese-supported Islamic army.” So there’s that vision of the future.

Tom Clancy’s relative moderation has still resulted in some geopolitically hilarious post-Cold War plots. The idea of hastily bringing Russia into NATO so as to ship American M1A1 Abrams tanks down the tran-Siberian railroad in order to jointly fight the invading Chinese is perhaps a little outlandish given present geopolitical realities. The merging of Iran and Iraq into a Unified Islamic Republic, following the assassination of Saddam Hussein, at least points out that an Iraqi power vacuum might indeed be filled by Tehran, but the similarities with reality end there.

On the other hand, some of the crazier ideas from the depths of the novelist or screenwriter or video game designer are useful indeed. Clancy is instructive here again. He’s not the only one to have thought it, but was by far the most mainstream author to feature a widebody aircraft used to strike a building, in Debt of Honor. Clear and Present Danger captured, even if unintentionally, the self-defeating nature of US counter-narcotic operations in Latin America. And The Sum of All Fears led to a recasting of the part of Jack Ryan (“just kidding,” says this Harrison Ford partisan).

But this is all a very long-winded introduction to talking about the other Bond novel, Cauldron. In this, a post-Cold War European Union is stillborn as the Western powers turn inwards and establish restrictive tariffs and other fiscally illiberal measures. Somewhere along the way, NATO collapses and is dissolved. Instead, a joint Franco-German diktat names itself “the European Confederation (EurCon)” and begins calls the shots in Europe, particularly the former Soviet Union, where cut-rate EuroCopter plants are established with the DGSE running things from behind the scenes. All this comes to a head when a few nations – particularly Poland – refuse to join EurCon, and in response, EurCon cuts off gas shipments in coordination with Russia (hmmm…). The United States commits to supplying Poland, EurCon attempts to stop them, and before you know it, German tanks are yet again rolling towards Gdansk. Only this time, under supreme French command

The Franco-German leadership of Europe is a reality even today. But the tables are turned, with relative hardliners in Germany threatening the sanctity of the European project for…what, exactly? Euros? To “send a message” to those spendthrift Greeks? In Cauldron, France is the military power and Germany the economic one (relatively). Bond certainly nailed that reality, only he underestimated the primacy of the dollar/deutschemark/euro in the free trader’s paradise that is today.

We live in one of many possible worlds; it could always be worse. Or better.

I am reminded of a story from a previous job (and which predates my work there), in which wargames were being pitched to a customer along the lines of a number of scenarios. One stood out, which had had a lot of thought put into it, but was rejected as being “too outlandish.” That scenario? A Crimean War Redux in which Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula.

Thinking the unthinkable is truly a job for not just the fiction writer, but for everyone. And there is a wide swath of good thinkers producing interesting novels today. Daniel Suarez’s Daemon series, Pressfield’s The Profession, the inescapable Ghost Fleet by August Cole and P.W. Singer (and if reviews of the latter are any indication, it is indeed a must-read) – all at the very least encourage their readers to grapple with the ideas within, even if just to call “bullshit” on them.

The worst mistake we can make is assuming that trends will progress unabated, and that the world of the future will look like now, only slightly more advanced. That’s an easier scene to envision. It’s harder to conjure up or flesh out those moments and events and technologies that will throw us off our current trajectory. And what’s even more difficult is trying to predict where we then might land.

The important thing, though, is to try.

Wait, What?

Every so often, I will have a mild revelation and ask myself, “Why are we still in Afghanistan?” It’s similar to the mental whiplash I developed in the run-up to the Iraq War, when all of a sudden the national conversation switched from one about Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan, and Tora Bora to yellowcake uranium and l’Affaire du Plame.

Despite his somewhat over-exaggerated blame (though sadly, his position grows a little more plausible each day), I found Howard Hart’s recent take on our efforts in Afghanistan a pretty convincing echo of my own thoughts. To wit:

Leaving Afghanistan would mean that the Taliban would officially take over the country – most of which they already control. So what? It has controlled Afghanistan before. America is under no moral or political obligation to re-make the country into some sort of “democratic” state. It would make it easier for Pakistan to deal with both its internal radical Islamic threat and with a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan (which Pakistan knows will be the end result of the war).

Difficult as it is for us freedom-and-democracy-loving Americans to admit, free elections will not be how the war in Afghanistan ends. Perhaps we are under some sort of moral obligation to attempt to stabilize the country, having brought war and destruction to it, but we’ve had nine years to work that out, and failed miserably. There are no positive outcomes. The only question is whether the Taliban returns sooner or later. And the longer we wait, the more it costs us.

Your depressing thought for the day.

Reagan, Thatcher, and the ‘Tilt’

The British election has decided in favor of no one in particular. The possibilities seem confined to a Conservative minority Government or a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition one. With so much going wrong for Britain (just look at the accidental disenfranchisement), the last priority of whatever the new British Government is will be their friend across the pond.

At the same time, Rockhopper has claimed to have discovered oil in the area of the Falkland Islands, reversing the disappointment felt by Desire Petroleum earlier this year. With these two events in mind, it seems like a perfect moment to look back at the last time the special relationship really came to the fore, while the Falklands were in the news.


The Falkland Islands

One of the last vestiges of British empire, the likelihood that the Falkland Islands would ever become a household name – let alone the site of a major twentieth century conflict – seemed slim at best. Yet when the military government of Argentina dared to invade in April of 1982, the successful British retaking of the Falklands entered into the realm of legend and revitalized both Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government and Great Britain as a whole.

The extent to which American assistance was a crucial part of the British war effort is still debated. Paul Sharp claims that “Britain’s success in the Falklands War…would not have been possible without US support.”[1]Then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger downplayed the role of American aid, characterizing himself as a mere “assistant supply sergeant, or an assistant quartermaster.” He placed the glory of victory solely with the British:

Some said later that the British could not have succeeded if we had not helped. This is not so – I think the decisive factor was Mrs. Thatcher’s firm and immediate decision to retake the Islands, despite the impressive military and other advice to the effect that such an action could not succeed.[2]

Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan's cabinets meet at the White House, 1981.

While the revival of the wartime Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ did not necessarily ensure a British victory, the effects that American support had on British and Argentinian morale and indeed, world opinion, were significant. As Sharp explains, “had the Americans decided to oppose Britain’s recovery of the Islands, then the war would have been impossible and Thatcher’s political demise all but assured.”[3]

The sophisticated weaponry supplied by the Pentagon, such as the Sidewinder air-to-air missile and the Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missile, helped to minimize British casualties. Especially crucial was US intelligence. That support was all the more surprising as it constituted a near-complete reversal of the centuries-old Monroe Doctrine demarcating the western hemisphere as an entirely American preserve.

Continue reading

More on Clausewitz

Patrick Porter takes on Admiral Mullen’s classification of Kandahar as the enemy “center of gravity” in anticipation of the upcoming offensive there:

Is Kandahar the centre?  Does the Taliban even have a centre that we can meaningfully disrupt within time? The critical condition for most violent insurgencies is external and usually international support. If that applies to this case, the Taliban’s centre may not be its sway in Kandahar, but its relationship with Pakistan, both the state and powerbrokers within it.

This isn’t the first time a major operation has been launched to strike at an enemy “center of gravity.” In fact, it happened fairly recently, and as I then pointed out, the military’s insistence on a) clinging to the term and b) if applicable, attacking that center of gravity is just irresponsible.

But more generally, this seems to be a movement lacking any important centers of gravity. That’s the whole problem with counterinsurgency; there’s no decisive point at which to apply pressure. It’s trying to tighten your grip on a handful of sand. Obviously I’m not saying give up the ghost, but I am suggesting that perhaps the whole concept of a large offensive whilst fighting an insurgency is an anachronism.

Kandahar probably is where we need to be, but if we’re doing so for these Clausewitzian theories… then we’re just missing the point.


Lance Cpls. Keith B. Lawson and Spence G. Press, scout snipers attached to Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, work together to identify targets as Taliban fighters approached from Marjeh toward their position at the “Five Points” intersection Feb. 9, 2010.

Last night, the American, British, and Afghan assault on Marjah began. 6,000 soldiers were in the initial wave, and another 15,000 have been committed to rooting out Taliban-aligned elements operating in the area. Early reports have five Taliban fighters and one British soldier killed.

Resistance has been “light.”

In the run-up to the attack, there was no shortage of criticism over the advance warning given, the stated objectives, and even the target of Marjah itself. It was certainly well-founded. Registan argued that the strategic value of Marjah was limited at best and that the amount of opium production in the area was overstated, while Wired characterized the Coalition heads-up as asking residents to “please, please, pretty please don’t leave the warzone.” But everyone may be wrong about the purpose (or at least the timescale) of fighting in Marjah altogether. From Free Range International:

When the Marines crossed the line of departure today, the battle for Marjah had already been won.

Like a master magician General Nicholson mesmerized the press with flashy hand movements to draw attention away from what was important.  The press then focused on the less important aspects of the coming fight.  Just like a magic show the action occurred right in front of the press in plain view yet remained out of sight.

In an unparalleled combination of regular and special forces units, the real conflict over Marjah was conducted mostly behind the scenes. It’s too early to say for sure, but the FRI analysis sure does raise some interesting points. If the goal was to convince the Taliban (and not the civilian inhabitants of Marjah) to leave, doesn’t that just allow them to escape and regroup? (i.e., what’s the point?) Obviously avoiding civilian casualties is of huge concern, but there still seems to be a disconnect over goals and methods.

Conversely, even if everything is going as planned and the Taliban bugs out, “somebody has to do the hold and build – it is not fair or smart to put that burden on the 2nd MEB.” Absolutely. I can’t help but wonder how thoroughly the post-battle plan was thought out.

Either way, at this point nothing to do but play the waiting game. Now let’s see how this plays out.